The Moral Dilemmas About Trying Pinochet in Spain by Goti, Jaime Malamud
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review
4-1-2001
The Moral Dilemmas About Trying Pinochet in
Spain
Jaime Malamud Goti
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Inter-
American Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jaime Malamud Goti, The Moral Dilemmas About Trying Pinochet in Spain, 32 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 1 (2001)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr/vol32/iss1/2
ARTICLE
The Moral Dilemmas About Trying Pinochet
in Spain
JAIME MALAMUD GOTI*
In 1998, in response to an application from Spanish Judge
Baltasar Garz6n, a British court placed former Chilean dictator
Augusto Pinochet Ugarte under arrest while he was receiving
medical treatment at a London clinic. The probe clearly singled
out the general as the key figure in thousands of abuses
perpetrated by military and paramilitary personnel in Chile.
The Spanish court had also gathered evidence that implicated
Pinochet in the commission of an assortment of crimes beyond
his country's borders.
The judicial proceedings in England were fraught with
jurisdictional controversies concerning mostly the scope of
national sovereignty. Among the topics were the authority of
foreign courts to try crimes committed within Chilean boundaries
and the immunity of a head of state from criminal prosecution for
acts performed within the sphere of his office. Pinochet's
tribulations in England ended when the British government,
There are many friends whose patience and help merit my recognition. I have benefited
with ideas and suggestions from Paul Kahn, Owen Fiss, George P. Fletcher, Robert Burt,
Thomas Pogge, Pablo de Greiff, Martin Farrell, Marcelo Alegre, Carlos Rosenkrantz,
Lucas Grosman, Martin Bohmer, Roberto Saba, Paola Bergallo, Laura Saldivia and Juan
F. Gonzalez Bertomeu. I would like to thank Leigh Macdonald for her assistance in
improving this text and for her outstanding kindness. I am also thankful to Maximo Becu
for his incomparable intellectual as well as moral support.
1. Among the latter was the assassination of Orlando Letelier in Washington D.C.
and of Chilean General Carlos Prats in Buenos Aires. Furthermore, evidence also pointed
to Pinochet as masterminding Plan Condor, a combined military terrorist campaign to
suppress "subversives" throughout the Southern Cone. The extradition request, however,
was confined to those offenses indirectly perpetrated by Pinochet within Chilean territory.
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considering the general, in his mid eighties, too frail to withstand
trial in Spain, allowed the general to fly back to Chile. After a
heated political debate in Santiago, the Chilean Supreme Court
expedited criminal proceedings against the general by stripping
him of the parliamentary immunity he enjoyed as a senator for
life. Thus, to the chagrin of millions of sympathizers of Pinochet,
he is now liable to be tried for numerous criminal complaints
filed against him.
Pinochet is not the only Latin American alleged human
rights abuser to be indicted by European courts. In the year
2000, two Argentine military officers were under arrest outside
Argentina, awaiting extradition to Spain and France.2 The
international underpinnings of the Pinochet extradition case
have spawned an array of illuminating essays on impunity and
international justice. Most of these papers tackle the issue of the
limits imposed by national sovereignty to try criminals for
offenses perpetrated within foreign territorial boundaries.3 Some
of them also broach the issue of present and future international
rule of law. There is an interesting and uneasy tension between
a serious attempt to end the impunity of powerful state criminals
and the decision of judges from First World countries trying state
criminals from peripheral countries such as Chile and Argentina.
This creates a troublesome sense of inequity that stems from
current prosecutions of human rights violations. As events are
thus far unfolding, it seems feasible for French, Swiss, Spanish
and U.S. courts to try and punish Argentine generals, Haitian
attaches and a Chilean dictator.4 By contrast, prospects of trying
Henry Kissinger, McGeorge Bundy, and Western European and
U.S. political actors and decision-makers and war criminals seem
more than remote.' This apparent disparity between actors from
2. See, e.g., Kenneth Roth, Towards an International System of Justice? Address at
Columbia University (March 9, 1999); see also Paul W. Kahn, On Pinochet, paper
delivered at the Seminario en Latinoamerica de Teoria Constitucional y Politica (SELA),
1999 La Serena, Chile (hereinafter papers of SELA) (on file with author).
3. See Mexico Breaks Legal Ground, BUENOS AIRES HERALD, Feb. 4, 2001 (One
Argentine was released; there is only one pending case. In early 2001, Mexico decided to
extradite Ricardo Miguel Cavallo, a former Argentine military officer accused of torturing
political prisoners during the 1976-1983 military regime. The extradition request was
also made by Spanish criminal judge Baltasar Garzon).
4. It evokes the arrest of strongman Manuel Noriega in his homeland Panama to
have him tried and sentenced in the United States, where he now serves a life sentence
for his involvement in the international drug trade.
5. It seems thus far inconceivable that a Vietnamese, Costa Rican or Brazilian
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powerful and not so powerful nations causes a perceptible strain
between two basic principles of law and justice. The first is that
of defeating impunity as a serious form of inequality within
terrorized communities.6 The second is the observance of some
minimal evenhandedness required by the rule of law. Whereas
one could claim that justice is served every time a human rights
abuser is convicted, it is no less true that the rule of law is
dubiously compatible with extremely sporadic and selective
enforcement! Indeed, according to standard conceptions the rule
of law is contingent upon the regular and impartial law
enforcement! It is true that the notion of the rule of law may
allow for certain degree of uneven enforcement based on political
necessity and natural catastrophes. What negatively hurts the
rule of law is the discrete prosecution of just one segment of the
world's state criminals, however vicious, when disregard for
other equally vicious abusers is grounded in reasons as alien to
our notion of retributive justice as the disparity of power in
international relations.' Such considerations allow room for
plenty of skepticism concerning the place we actually allot
justice.
The purpose of this paper is to partake in this debate about
the merits and demerits of international criminal justice in
prosecuting state criminals. I tackle the topic but from a
different perspective than the doctrine of national sovereignty or
the tension between the rule of law and an uneven system of
international human rights justice. Although I cannot completely
court successfully extradites Captain Medina for his part in the massacre of civilians in
My Lai during the Viet Nam War. Noticeably, none of the living right-wing Franco
underlings have ever been investigated, let alone indicted, for the multitudinous war
crimes committed during and after the Spanish Civil War. This fact is particularly
relevant considering that prosecutions for war crimes, such as the summary executions of
prisoners, are not barred by any statute of limitations in force.
6. Jaime Malamud Goti, Punishment, Dignity And Trust, papers of SELA, La
Serena, Chile (1999) (on file with author).
7. See THOMAS M. SCANLON, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 257-271 (Yale University Press, 1999) (Thomas Scanlon stresses the need for a
minimal "evenness" between the legal treatment of analogous cases. I prefer a more
relaxed view of the principle that some basic impartiality should be observed if we
consider the trials of human rights as the stepping stone of a new system of international
legality).
8. I concede that the rule of law could still survive the lack of regular enforcement
insofar as disparities can be justified as owing to impartial reasons.
9. I give some latitude to the notion of "moral relevance," including political
necessity and opportunity as different from reasons stemming from the wealth or militia
power of the nations where the perpetrators belong.
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detach my own perspective from criticism stemming from
sovereignty, I will assume that prosecutions do not depend on
power - military, economic or strategic - related differences
between the nations states of culprits and judges. I lay out the
thesis that, in dealing with "domestic" state abuses, the goals and
purposes of criminal justice can only be satisfactorily
accomplished by what I call courts from within, that is, by
justices that belong in the same community as do victims and
perpetrators. I acknowledge this stance leads to a dilemma: on
the one hand, that of ending impunity in accordance with our
intuitions and, on the other, avoiding a justice system that is
unlikely to bring about the effects we expect from punishing state
criminals. I deliberately exclude what may be considered in
essence international state criminality as was the case of Nazi
war crimes and crimes against humanity, the Turks' genocidal
campaign against Armenian population, and so on. I also limit
the notion of domestic state crimes not just to those perpetrated
by some individuals against other members of their own
community. For the purpose of this paper, the notion of domestic
state crimes does not encompass abuses committed by state
agents against citizens of the same country but who are also
members of particular ethnic and religious groups."
My point is also based on a certain notion about the goals
and purposes of punishing state criminals. First, as some
scholars such as Herbert Morris' and George Fletcher12 have
claimed, a retributive justice system benefits society in that
punishment re-establishes the equal status of victims and
perpetrators. This appeal to the equalizing function of
punishment acquires special meaning in the case of state
brutality. Victims of state abuse are not only the thousands of
10. See generally LIBBET CRANDON MALAMUD, FROM THE FAT OF OUR
SOULS (University of California Press 1991) (I acknowledge the fact that the very notion
of ethnicity is extremely slippery. Ethnic communities may be the concoction of certain
policies and ideologies, as some Rwandans claim in relation to the distinction between
Tutsies and Hutus. In essence, however, there is a patent difference between the
circumstances surrounding the abuses committed in the Southern Cone in the 70's (and
the persecutions carried out by Communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe) on
the one hand, and, on the other, those perpetrated against the indigenous population in
Guatemala, the blacks in South Africa and the Muslims in Bosnia).
11. See generally HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE (University
of California Press 1976).




people killed, tortured and incarcerated but also the large
segment of population living under constant great fear and
instability. These numerous victims of state criminality demand
that we resort to punishment as the strongest institutional
remedy against shame and loss of self-respect and esteem." The
perception of our rights hinges on these sentiments which are
thus essential to building a rights-based democracy. Yet it seems
obvious that the victim cannot recover her lost dignity without
trust in the impartiality and competency of the court sentencing
the culprit. It follows that to attach an equalizing effect to
punishment presupposes the courts' decisions are authoritative:
that verdicts be perceived as reflecting the truth about the facts
and the right principles and rules.
-2-
The rather short and barren history of trials of state
criminals reveals that the courts have varied considerably both
in establishing and weighing criminal responsibility. The largest
perceptible difference between these criteria has mostly hinged
on whether the perpetrators are tried from within or from
without: on whether the justices and the perpetrators belong in
the same community. The paramount exponents of trial from
without are the post-World War II trials of German officials held
at Nuremberg. Trials from within are illustrated by the 1985
Buenos Aires trials of the members of the military juntas that
ruled Argentina from 1976 to 1983.
This distinction concerning the national origin of the judges
acquires a particularly salient dimension if we take blame to be
the starting point in defining the contours of criminal
responsibility. 4 This tack, which I will call subjective, contrasts
with the traditional practice of establishing criminal
responsibility in accordance with certain conditions that render
the actor morally responsible, thus detaching it from any
particular vantage point.15
13. Malamud Goti, supra note 6.
14. See Peter F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in FREE WILL 59 ff. (Gary
Watson, ed. Oxford University Press 1982) (groundbreaking article); See also R. JAY
WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND MORAL SENTIMENTS (Harvard University Press
1996).
15. CARLOS S. NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL (Yale University Press 1996);
JAIME MALAMUD GOTI, GAME WITHOUT END: STATE TERROR AND THE
POLITICS OF JUSTICE (University of Oklahoma Press 1996); Una Manera Peculiar de
Inculpar: Lo Que Qued6 de los Juicios a los Militares, in EL DERECHO PENAL HOY:
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What becomes decisive if we adopt the subjective perspective
in connection with trials conducted from within and from without
is the fact that judges address different audiences. A
consequence of this is that the "justice"16 and value of the verdicts
do not reflect, at least not entirely, the express legal reasons in
which these decisions are couched. Parallel to these express
reasons operates implicit - and at times concealed - motives and
purposes which originate in the relationship between the court
and the audience it addresses. By and large, the justices in the
Argentine court that tried the generals addressed their nationals;
by contrast the audience was, for the judges at Nuremberg, the
HOMENAJE AL PROFESOR DAVID BAIGUN, 385 (Editorial El Puerto, Buenos Aires
1995) (The crux of this tack is the notion of responsibility generating facts, establishing
that an act fulfills certain properties that render the act worthy of condemnation. While
this objective approach focuses on an act and its consequences, the subjective alternative
consists in establishing the conditions under which we are entitled to condemn a certain
person by crediting him with inflicting some harm on a third party. Thus, the subjective
approach involves establishing the presence of certain conditions that make it morally
right or fair to condemn an agent or its act. There are two properties about the subjective
approach that makes it more attractive than its objective alternative. The first is
theoretical. By making responsibility hinge on the concept of blame it is stripped from
any metaphysical contours. Based on the external notion of "responsibility generating
facts" considered independently from the stance or attitude in which allotting
responsibility originates, the external approach evokes the unconvincing idea of "moral
facts." The second feature that makes the internal approach more attractive is essentially
practical. It lies the fact that this tack ties the notion of an offense more naturally into
the wider picture of victims striving to express the truth about their suffering and having
the perpetrators exposed and punished. This tack is narrowly tied to the moral
sentiments of the community, especially the victim's resentment and indignation. Placing
the victim at the center stage provides a particularly adequate depiction of a recurrent
political scene in communities emerging from rampant state criminality. Thus, we think
of a blamer in two different senses. The first is that of a person having a legitimate
concern in connection with the offense: being a direct or indirect victim, having an
interest in preventing future abuses, pursuing the removal of the offender from society,
and so on. The second sense refers to our thinking of a blamer according to his or her
legal standing: having a right to plea following the proper procedures, being entitled to
accuse the perpetrator and denounce him from the witness stand. I use the quotation
marks to stress the fact that I am not referring to "justice" as the virtue of certain
decisions. I use the term to identify with some vagueness the outcome of applying certain
(impartial) reasons and evaluations that are characteristic of the act of judging. By
justice I also mean the perception, external to the act of making the decision, that it
consists of something other than simply imposing coercion by the courts. In this sense,
"justice" is linked to the notion of authority, that the courts are envisaged as knowing the
facts that lead to acquittals and convictions and apply the appropriate rules to evaluate
the action in point.
16. I am not referring to justice as the virtue or quality of a decision but rather
loosely to "justice" as the authoritativeness of a decision. By the latter I mean the
assumption that it is perceived as based on an informed opinion about the facts and
grounded in the correct values and principles.
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entire world community, although much could be said for the
special relevance of the American, British, Soviet and French
audiences. 7 Trials and convictions are meant to teach a lesson,
and therefore, the question of to whom is this lesson aimed
becomes crucial. As early as 1946, Justice Wyzansky noticed
that the Nuremberg Trials would not teach the German people
what Nazism was all about. For the Germans, the trials were
simply political in a bad sense. 8 Rather, Wyzansky emphasized,
they were aimed at persuading a different community, the World
community. 9 Like all audiences, this audience was targeted by
the court as its point of persuasion, its basis of credibility."0
Similarly, Telford Taylor, the Chief Counsel for War Crimes at
Nuremberg, understood that the purpose of the trials of Nazi
criminals was "the benefit of mankind."2'
The particular relevance of these premises is that the courts
enjoy a certain base of authority: a segment or group for which
its decisions are credible in two ways. The first relates to the
ability of the court to discover, select and support itself on the
relevant facts. The second is to the court's impartiality in
grounding its decision in the correct principles, rules and values.
Credence in the "justice" of the court's decisions among those
affected by its verdicts and by other members of the community
enables the court to bring to a closure those conflicts brought to
its decision."
17. See Judge Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., Nuremberg: A Fair Trial? Dangerous
Precedent, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, April 1946, vol. 177, no. 4 at 66-70 (This point
was suggested as early as 1946 by Judge Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr. of the District Court of
Masachussetts).
18. Id.
19. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS AND POLITICAL TRIALS
154-5 (Harvard 1986) (Shklar is of a different opinion as to the purposes of the trials. For
her, they were aimed at "eliminating the Nazi leaders in such a way that their
contemporaries, on whom the immediate future of Germany depended, might learn
exactly what had occurred in recent history." Schklar admits, however, that the trials
were not addressed to re-install a democratic system in Germany).
20. Wyzansky, supra note 17 (Wyzansky distinguishes between persuasive justice
and sheer propaganda. It was clear that for the Germans it would largely become the
latter).
21. See Telford Taylor, Final Report of the Secretary of the Army on the Nuremberg
War Crime Trials Under Contro Council No. 10, Selection of Defendants 73-85 (Library of
Congress, Catalog Card No. 97-72142 Washington D.C. August 15, 1949) (reprinted in
Wlliam S. Hein & Co., Inc., Buffalo, New York, 1997).
22. See Malamud Goti, supra note 6 (Elsewhere, I have distinguished different levels
of authority depending on whether it encompasses only the parties or the community as a
whole. This distinction is relevant, for instance, in the effects of a criminal conviction.
2001]
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Thus, I submit that the relationship between the authority of
the court exceeds the formal reasons that ground the verdicts.
There are unexpressed ways in which the relations between the
courts and the specific audiences they address model the content
of their verdicts. This principle seems evident yet its
consequences are not completely apparent. I set out to
demonstrate that, in this connection, only trials held from within
the community of the perpetrators are likely to fully justify a
criminal conviction. To illustrate my point I draw on the 1945
trial of Ernst von Weiszaecker in Nuremberg, and the 1985 trial
of Orlando Agosti by the Federal Court of Appeals in Buenos
Aires.
a. Ernst von Weizsaecker
Ernst von Weizsaecker was secretary of state at the
German foreign ministry between 1938 and 1943. He was
charged under seven counts in the Ministers Case, one of the
trials presided over by one of the three International Military
Tribunals set up at Nuremberg. Von Weizsaecker was at first
convicted on two counts: crimes against peace (waging war of
aggression) and crimes against humanity." The first count was
reversed upon petitioning the tribunal for review. The accused
could demonstrate his opposition to Germany's expansionist
policies and that, at the time of the invasion, he had revealed to
other officials his personal opinion that such policy would lead
Only if the court is authoritative to the victim will benefit the latter in restoring him a
sense of dignity the offense annulled. Belief in the correctness of the court's decision by
the community at large will restore the victim's self-esteem).
23, The extent of this credibility or authority is, however, relative to the nature and
magnitude of the conflict. It is somewhat obvious that given their nature and size, certain
conflicts enacted in the drama deteriorate the authority of the court, regardless of the
prestige of the judiciary or the personal authority of the justices. The Lorena Bobbit,
Rodney King, Dan White/Harvey Milk, and O.J. Simpson cases illustrate how, even in a
strong institutional system such as the United States, certain trials depicting the collision
of segments such as those of women and men, blacks and whites, and gays against
straight thwart the credibility of the courts. This discredits the courts' verdicts for at
least one party of the competing sector. In the O.J. Simpson case, the white segment
refused to accept (and will continue to do so) that the culprit should ever have been
acquitted. The opposite segment, that of American blacks, believed (and still does) that
the reasons to sentence Simpson to compensate the Nicole Brown's relatives were
anything but an act of "justice." The authority of the courts would be permanently
damaged by widespread incredulity if cases such as Simpson's became more frequent. As
I later explain, I call these trials "political" in a non-pejorative sense.
[Vol. 32:1
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Germany into a catastrophe. The assumption remained that,
having served as the second official at the foreign ministry, he
should have known of the genocidal policies of the Third Reich
and more concretely, of the deportation of Jews to Eastern
Europe and of their ultimate elimination. The tribunal believed
von Weizsacker's allegations that he had opposed the Reich's
policies and that he had actively plotted against Hitler. The
court also believed his claim that he had remained in office for
the purpose of circulating vital official information to his fellow
conspirators. The tribunal found that the accused should have
expressed his disagreement with Hitler's racist policies to SS
officials when they queried on this matter. Thus, in not having
completely discharged his moral duties, the tribunal found the
culprit guilty and sentenced him to seven years in prison of
which he ended up serving only one.
b. Brigadier General Orlando Ram6n Agosti
Brigadier General Orlando Ram6n Agosti was the
commander in chief of the Argentine air force and member of the
military junta that overthrew Isabel Peron in March 1976.
Together with his two comrades, the commanders of the navy
and the army, he was brought to trial and accused of being
responsible for the multiple offenses perpetrated by personnel
under his orders. Since the terrorist tactics had been planned
and decided at the highest echelons of each of the three military
branches, Agosti was accused of being the intellectual
perpetrator of innumerable abuses. These comprised multiple
disappearances and assassinations, a multiplicity of acts of
torture, and the massacre of over a hundred detainees at a
clandestine detention center that operated under the control of
the air force. The federal court dismissed most of the charges
against Agosti but still found him guilty of five counts of torture
and three of robbery. He was sentenced to four years and six
months of imprisonment.24
Our emotions play out differently in both cases. It is true
that Continental and Latin American judges enjoy sufficient
leeway in sentencing to render Agosti's conviction formally
24. See Alejandro Garro and Henry Dahl, Legal Accountability for Human Rights




consistent with the legal standards in force. It is also true,
nevertheless, that the four and a half year sentence does not
reflect the harshness we expect from taking seriously three
counts of robbery and five of torture. The von Weizsaecker case
instead seems overly exacting for any official in Hitler's
Germany. Most of us would not be inclined to consider him a
genuine hero rather than a criminal. Yet both decisions, however
dissimilar in nature and severity, may be considered authentic
"acts of justice.""
What makes the severity of both decisions so radically
asymmetric is the impossibility of confining the blame to strict
considerations about the facts and legal and moral values. This
process was strongly influenced by the political circumstances in
which the verdicts were handed down and their anticipated
impact. I want to stress that both were "political trials," not in a
pejorative sense that suggests the utilization of the justice
apparatus to favor allies or eliminate the politically undesirable.
These trials did not hinge on the principle that Goebbels
described as "this man must go."" They were not political like
the Dreyfus case or trials of dissidents under Stalinism. In ways
that require distinctions, both were political trials in a morally
neutral sense.
Briefly, I call political in the morally neutral sense those
trials that radically split society on politically sensitive issues.
The passions enacted in the court split society in two factions
that overflowed the authority of the courts: whatever the
outcome, members of at least one of the segments epitomized by
the parties would not accept the verdict as an impartial act of
justice. As human rights trials from within, those of the
Argentine generals were political in the sense that the O.J.
Simpson and the Rodney King trials were political. The
Nuremberg trials, an exponent of justice from without, instead,
linked the culprits' actions to the roles they had played and
which were contingent upon a political system. Those who
thought it was not for foreign judges to condemn the system or its
roles rejected the court's verdicts as genuine acts of justice. Nazi
sympathizers shared this opinion with those who believed that
trying political systems is way beyond the mission of the courts.
25. See Scanlon, supra note 7.
26. See Shklar, supra note 19, at 174.
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Von Weizsaecker was tried and convicted from without the
complexities of the Nazi Germany culture. The German culture
itself was on trial. 7 It seems reasonable to assume that, through
their verdict, the Allies' judges reflected the horror and the
indignation aroused by the discovery of the gas chambers and the
mass graves. The historic prestige of the Nuremberg trials lies
with the determination to expose before the world the genocidal
policies and the enslavement of entire civilian populations by
Nazi Germany. These policies, the tribunal exhibited, were not
the outcome of a fistful of lunatic members of Hitler's party and a
limited number of officers of the SS but of an evil political
system. It seems thus plausible to assume that by convicting von
Weizsaecker the court set out to reveal that serving a delinquent
regime as politicians or bureaucrats was itself reprehensible.
The trial was on Germany as a whole. 8 Thus, only opposing the
genocidal procedures and terrorist practices would acquit an
officer from the blame even if doing so had meant certain death.
It is true that this view resulted from the criterion that
responsibility required that the culprit had not only held a
certain formal post but also that he violated a substantive moral
principle." However, by demanding overt opposition to Hitler's
policies, the court was imposing on von Weizsaecker a
particularly stringent moral duty. Such strict view was the
consequence of passing judgement from without the realm where
directly or derivatively, through positive acts or omissions,
millions of people contributed to the criminal design of the Nazi
system. It thus seems obvious that the court's audience was not
the German people on whom the impact of the verdicts was not
central to the court.2 " It can be inferred that, for the justices at
Nuremberg, a new German democracy could have never been
built through the process of subtly sorting out those individuals
who were morally fit to build the new German democracy from
among the throngs of Nazi followers. In the eyes of the judges at
Nuremberg that undertaking demanded a fresh start.
The Argentine tribunal, instead, tried the facts from within
27. See Id. at 147.
28. See Id.
29. See Taylor, supra note 21.
30. See Id. (This contention may be inferred from the express purposes of the trials.
In the Introduction to his Report, Telford Taylor states that "the Nuremberg Trials were
carried out under quadripartite authority, but in pursuit of objectives thought to be of
benefit to all mankind").
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the culture of the "dirty war" in which thousands of agents -
involved directly and indirectly - caused the disappearance and
the death of thousands of persons terrorizing the entire
population. Unlike the Nuremberg trials, the audience to which
the verdict was addressed was the same as that in which the
perpetrators belonged. The impact the decisions were expected
to effect was also different. Just as the great majority of the
politicians and functionaries of Argentina's post-dictatorial
community, Argentine justices had been players in the corrupt
system. They had served as members of the dictatorship's
judicial apparatus and, in spite of not having been the target of
concrete accusations for their behavior during that period, their
election by the president brought about some adverse reactions
by some human rights activists and progressive politicians. By
and large, and not without reservations, the population believed
in these judges (insofar, at least, as their verdict did not upset
their expectations.) It also seems clear that a different choice of
judges would not have elicited a better outcome. The
appointment of new and inexperienced magistrates would have
elicited equally pungent accusations from right-wing quarters. It
would have convinced them they were being tried by a kangaroo
court, that the appointed judges were directly charged with
convicting the defendants. Similar to the process of jury
selection, electing the judges becomes crucial to the outcome of
political trials in which the attainment of a basis of authority
becomes essential to a democratic project.
-3-
The starting premises of the trials of von Weizsaecker and
Agosti necessarily distance the nature of the resulting verdicts.
In Argentina, prospects of setting up a democracy compelled the
judges to concoct distinctions to establish and gradate
responsibility on the basis of peculiarities that we commonly
regard as political. Such distinctions were a necessary step
toward building a democracy under the same political leadership
that had - in some way or other- largely acquiesced to the 1976-
1983 terrorist regime. This peculiar process led judges and
prosecutors to overlook some facts and forget others. Nations are
built, explains Benedict Anderson, around great remembrances
but also through obliviousness.3 Some degree of oversight and
31. See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS
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forgetfulness are intimately connected with the practice of
blaming.
Blame serves the purpose of simplifying social facts by
singling out the morally relevant cause of some harm. We thus
blame those who cause our suffering by transgressing our moral
principles and values. This descriptive approach, however,
provides no insight into the actual appeal of blaming wrongdoers
as a social practice: the why and the when we actually blame
agents for their legal and moral infringements. To account for
the latter requires resorting to a manipulative, forward-looking,
version of blame, which I believe, requires two conditions. The
first is emotional: we cannot claim to seriously sustain a moral
principle if breaches of it do not arouse emotions, largely
resentment and indignation. 2 Second, blaming requires that we
implicitly or explicitly expect to provide reasons to discourage the
wrongdoer and others from doing it again. Prosecutions and
trials are forms of making our blaming public, which implies the
expectation that others share our emotions and background
assumptions about factual and moral beliefs. When some degree
of support is hopeless to us, blaming others publicly loses its
basic appeal.
In the 40s and 50s, for instance, we would not have expected
a large enough segment of the community to share our privately
held view that many industrialists were blameworthy for
polluting our rivers and lakes. In contracting an infectious
disease, the community at large turned their blame to the
intoxicated water drinker or the reckless swimmer. The same is
true with the effects of state terrorism and the process of
targeting our blame. In the eyes of many Argentines it was also
the victims' recklessness that caused their suffering in the hands
of their abductors and torturers." Devoid of its moral
underpinnings, blame frequently befell the victim, hoping this
would persuade others to adjust to the tyrant's demands.
ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 187-206 (Verso Press, New York,
Revised ed. 1991) (French historian Ernest Renan stated, "Or, l'essence d'une nation est
que tous les individus aien beaucoup de chose en commun est aussi que tous aient oublie
bien des choses. . .").
32. See Bernard Williams, Morality and the Emotions, in PROBLEMS OF THE
SELF 207 (Cambridge University Press, 1973).
33. See generally JAIME MALAMUD GOTI, GAME WITHOUT END: STATE
TERROR AND THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE (University of Oklahoma Press 1996).
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These variations in the practice of blaming are peculiar to
political transitional processes. 4 I take the case of the 1973-75
systematic assassinations by ultra-right wing groups in
Argentina. During the post-dictatorial human rights trials, the
focus of the prosecutions were almost exclusively military
officers. Accidentally, unwittingly and even unconsciously,
prosecutors failed to take action against ultra right-wing
Peronista henchmen for the systematic assassination of
dissidents. The single most egregious abuse perpetrated by this
group was the March 1973 massacre of their rivals of the
Peronista Youth near the airport where Peron was expected to
land on his return from his long exile in Spain.35 Hundreds of
youths were slaughtered in this gruesome incident, yet it is likely
that if these abuses had not been overlooked, prosecutions of
members of these groups would have been viewed as a political
device geared to advance the partisan interests of the politicians
in office. This belief would have reinforced the political nature of
the trials in the non-pejorative sense I have explained. The effect
would have been the loss of the courts badly needed basis of
authority. What caused the obliviousness was thus emphasis on
consensus in the attainment of democratic authority.
Prosecution and conviction of military officers was itself an
example of selective blame. In the process of seeking for itself an
authoritative base among its domestic audience, the court
convicted five out of nine members of the military juntas that
ruled Argentina between 1976 and 1983. Furthermore, only two
defendants were awarded life sentences despite the fact that all
of them were convicted on charges that, by ordinary standards,
warranted the harshest verdicts. To reach this outcome, the
court had repelled a move by the prosecution to establish the
responsibility of each commander as contingent upon the
activities of the juntas under which each one had served. The
move by the prosecution was well-grounded in that each of the
four juntas that ruled Argentina between 1976 and 1983 had
formally held supreme military control over the operations that
concluded in the thousands of assassinations and
34. See STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT, On the Theory of
Liberal Democracy 210 (University of Chicago Press 1995) (Holmes refers to the politics of
"active forgetfulness" (quoting Friedrich Nietzche) and... keeping retribution for former
crimes off the political agenda...").
35. See MARTIN EDWIN ANDERSEN, DOSSIER SECRETO 85-87 (Westview
Press, Boulder, Co. 1992).
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disappearances. Furthermore, there was substantial evidence
pointing to the fact that there had been enough deliberation
among members of each junta to credit them with full knowledge
of what was happening. This created the presumption that all
members had been equally cognizant of the repressive scheme as
well as the ongoing terrorist campaign. The decision to establish
the responsibility of each defendant separately provided the court
with extra freedom to gradate the accountability of each
commander.
In this process of establishing different degrees of
responsibility among some defendants and acquitting the rest,
the court employed a high degree of selectivity, including the
dismissal of numerous charges. Formally, the court's criterion on
responsibility lay with the culprits' actions, positive and
omissive; informally, the tribunal also relied on each force's
comparative role in the criminal campaign as well as the player's
public image. The actual standards - those that resulted in
Agosti's extremely light sentence - were based on complex and
politically sensitive criteria. The outcome would have been
inexplicable without this sensitivity that partly accounted for
domestic public opinion. I am doubtful, however, that the trial's
approach was actually successful in attaining widespread
credibility among most segments of society. I contend that
failure to prosecute ultra-right wing Peronista vigilante groups
and differentiating between the military top officers was the
right strategy to avoid fracturing the polity into two unwavering
rival segments. This fracture, furthermore, corresponded with
the social split that wound up in state terrorism. In passing
judgement, a trial from without would have been impervious to
these consequences. I later return to this topic.
-4-
The difference between courts from within and from without
is crucial. In the process of building for itself a basis of authority,
the former risks surrendering too much moral ground to the
political, whereas the latter seems too prone to oversimplify the
political reality of the community where the perpetrators belong.
Because of its stronger proclivity to radically split the population,
trials from without dramatically limit the formation of judicial
authority. Two Rwandan high officials - who refused to convey
whether they considered themselves to be Hutu or Tutsi -
assured me that, in assuming that the barbaric persecutions had
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been based on clearly differentiated ethnicities, national and
international human rights trials in their country had artificially
re-created their tribal identities. Through the process of blaming
Hutus, the criminal proceedings had a strong impact in shaping
the country's subsequent reality. The consequence was the lack
of credibility of the courts among the Hutu. In fact, they
reproduced one of the achievements of the Belgian colonial policy,
namely that of stringently splitting the native population into
two clearly, and artificially, confrontational native groups. It is
true that the ethnic undertones clearly differentiate this case
from those of Chile and Argentina. It provides an example,
however, of how formalized blame may contribute to strengthen
division and, eventually, deepen antagonism, as well.
Formalized blame is a powerful factor in shaping the
political and social reality of a community. This applies, of
course, to post-Pinochet Chile. There is little doubt that Pinochet
committed heinous crimes in the most orthodox sense. But some
state criminals like him have millions of followers, many of whom
do not hesitate to take to the streets to express their disavowal of
the criminal investigations; especially those conducted by a
foreign judge or prosecutor. The effects of a hypothetical trial
and conviction of Pinochet by a court from without are
unpredictable at best. Trials from within seem far more
promising.
The direct participation of the justices in the life of the
dictatorial community lead to the politically-based discriminating
decisions I have been mentioning. The consequence of applying
to the Argentine military the standards applied to von
Weizsaecker would have split society into two camps. The first
would have encompassed those who directly or indirectly
supported the military regime and its tactics. The second would
have consisted of the regime's direct and indirect victims. " This
predicament, similarly artificial to that of the Tutsies and Hutus,
would have stripped the sentencing tribunal from minimal
authoritativeness. Clearly, authority is not achievable in a
36. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 143-152 (Ed. by J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart, with a new introduction by
F. Rosen, Oxford University Press, Oxford-New York 1996) (To define indirect victims, I
pick on Bentham's criterion that "crime generates among all members of a community




society split into two strongly contending factions. If not
neutrality, authority can only emerge in a community where a
large segment would place itself inside a gray area where they
qualify their allegiance to their cause. In this area, citizens must
be amenable to acknowledge that there are grounds in which the
party they support may have gone wrong. Without gray areas, it
is very likely that each faction will attribute the conviction of
members of their own side to some association between the court
and the contending segment.
To select the relevant deeds and to lay out a different
standard for conviction, a court from within would have taken an
entirely different approach. As the Argentine case suggests, in
allotting responsibility, it was the fact of the justices and culprits
belonging in the same community that resulted in responsibility
limiting criteria. Agosti's sentence may have caused discontent
among some human rights activists and a few politicians who
aligned with them, but it was never the cause of serious
frustration. As it happened, the court avoided a major social
split and in this way improved the chances of a successful
political transition.
In connection with the goal of advancing democracy, the task
of a court charged with trying Pinochet from within would be
twofold. First, it would have to generate widespread awareness
about the past, to establish the way in which state terrorism
actually took place, the extent and style massive violations were
ordered, encouraged, and tolerated from the top echelons of the
state apparatus. This is an enlightening endeavor. It stems from
the moral purposes of the trial, namely, as I later explain, the
attainment of conditions that justify punishment. Second, based
on extra-legal and moral grounds, the tribunal must craft subtle
distinctions among the thousands of actors that directly or
obliquely, through positive acts or omissions, participated in the
"dirty war." A "dirty war," it seems too obvious to mention,
demands the participation of a vast segment of the population.
In such environment, some individuals were at one time
perpetrators and at another time victims. The Chilean and
Argentine experiences reveal that, turned into wrongdoers
themselves, many victims betrayed their comrades." In a
37. See PAMELA CONSTABLE and ARTURO VALENZUELA, A NATION OF
ENEMIES: CHILE UNDER PINOCHET 144-147 (W.W. Norton and Company, New
York-London 1991) (In the case of Argentina, see MALAMUD GOTI, supra note 33, at 119
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terrorized community, breaches of intimate relations were
frequent and trust was often betrayed. There were desertions
among friends and colleagues; there were those who failed to aid
and succor members of their inner circle."8 Codes of ethics were
pervasively overlooked. To take some salient examples,
physicians refused to assist those in need of attention and most
lawyers rejected to furnish legal counsel to the families of the
disappeared and detainees undergoing systematic abuses.
The task of allocating and weighing individual moral
responsibility within a terrorized community - as was so in
Germany and Argentina - is a complicated endeavor. As Sartre
expresses in "The Dirty Hands," we are all victims and at the
same time accomplices. If we are thoroughgoing in trying the
abusers from without, our determination to convict Ernst von
Weizsaecker presupposes, both legally and morally, that we also
indict hundreds of high ranking officials who were knowledgeable
of the Nazi atrocities and legally required to report them, thwart
their execution and so on."5
When the abusers are tried from within, placing blame
becomes an entirely different proposition. Even if criminal blame
were to zero in exclusively on the inner circle of power and the
most conspicuous murderers and torturers, the cases of Agosti
and Pinochet suggest that this process is intricate at best.
Decisions would require a high degree of selectivity grounded in
political considerations and a gradation of responsibility based on
predictions on the verdict's anticipated consequences. Teasing
out from the responsibility of the members of the inner circle the
hundreds of subordinate agents who also were, by normal
standards, morally and legally responsible for torturing and
murdering, may prove to be extremely artificial. This
differentiated treatment in favor of serious transgressors is likely
to be devoid of any justification other than that based on
furthering democratic authority.0
-128).
38. See CONSTABLE, supra note 37 (in the case of Chile).
39. See Sanford Levinson, Responsibility for Crimes of War, in WAR AND MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY 133 (R.B. Brandt, et. al. eds., Princeton University Press, Princeton,
N.J. 1974) (It is clear that the Nuremberg Tribunal became aware of these difficulties, as
Sanford Levinson claims).
40. See Jaime Malamud Goti, Punishment and a Rights Based Democracy, 10-2.
GRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3 (1991); see also Jaime Malamud Goti, Dignity, Vengeance and
Fostering Democracy, 29 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 417-450 (1998) (Robert Burt
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It is clear that allocating blame from without should not be
quite as taxing save perhaps for logistic limitations and time
constraints. Telford Taylor stresses the importance of
expediency, and thus weighing the available evidence in selecting
targets for prosecution becomes a critical factor.4 Trials from
without will very often threaten the democratization process.
Those charged with exercising prosecutorial discretion are placed
in a position that could easily create a threat to the democratic
process. The outcome would be an extreme polarization such as
that of Tutsies and Hutus. In Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay,
the dramatic split between the "crusaders" and the "subversives'
would now turn into one between the "guilty" and the "innocent."
This new split would rekindle old conflicts and generate an
infinity of tensions caused by the intense resentment among
members of both factions. However, these consequences are only
contingent outcomes. What is certainly not contingent in a
society thus split is the impossibility of authority. Authority
becomes unattainable because, in such a setting, there is no room
for impartial allocation of blame. In this scenario, those
convicted will per force view the verdict as scapegoating,
vengeance, or both, rendering the trials political. Analogously,
acquittals will be interpreted as resulting from some form of
alliance with the ultra-right.
-5-
The thesis I espouse may raise two kinds of interrelated
objections. The first is, in the case of trials from within, that
conflict compels judges to attach too much import to the political.
They may be viewed as weighing too thoroughly the (political)
consequences of their decisions for these to deserve our respect as
impartial acts of justice. In favoring this kind of trials, I strip
them from their justification as a source of justice in the broadest
sense. The critique would claim, in other words, that I reduce the
meaning of convictions and acquittals of state criminals to an
essentially political question. Furthermore, in providing the
wrong incentives, sensitivity to political effects is likely to
backfire: it may convince the military that being restive
intimidates judges thus reducing the likelihood of convictions. 2
suggests that this approach is a genuine source of compassion. I support his view which
may apply to some officers who were legally responsible for serious wrongdoings).
41. See Taylor, supra note 21, at 74.
42. E-mail from Thomas Pogge, Professor of Philosophy, Columbia University, (on
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The second objection is that the verdicts that result from
these trials clash with our notion of "just punishment." What
seems to follow from differentiating trials from within and trials
from without is that just deserts are central only to the latter. I
respond to the first objection here and devote the following
section to the second.
I have elsewhere espoused the thesis that the justification of
punishing state criminals lies in the dignifying - and in some
relevant sense equalizing - effect of punishment. 43  By
establishing the truth and the moral meaning of the facts,
criminal convictions, for this thesis, have the primary effect of
dignifying the direct and indirect victims of the abuses. State
terrorism has a powerful influence on the community at large
and the individuals' perceptions of their own rights. Confusion,
uncertainty and constant fear cause people to forsake their ideals
and betray their loyalties and principles. This process leads to
shame and guilt and, consequently to the loss of our self-respect
and esteem and awareness of our rights. In Chile, Argentina,
Uruguay, Rwanda and Guatemala, victims of state terrorism
were not only the tortured, the murdered and those who were
close to them, but were also those who suffered the humiliating
experience of securing their survival by adjusting to whimsical
impositions. The latter are the innumerable indirect victims of
state terrorism.
Consistent with this approach, punishment ensures the
victim an equalizing effect: the attainment of respect and
consideration others enjoy." This effect does not benefit the
direct victims only, but also those who experienced fear of
becoming the victims of future abuses; punishment also quells
the resentment and indignation that result from the
wrongdoing. 5 Yet, to attach an equalizing, self-respect-building
file with author) (I am in debt to Thomas Pogge for pointing out this possibility. I should
add that the reason such possibility was not present in the case of trials from without
was the consequence that the latter were frequently backed by a strong protective
military presence).
43. See Jaime Malamud Goti, Punishment and a Rights Based Democracy, 10-2.
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, 3 (1991); see also JAIME MALAMUD GOTI, GAME WITHOUT
END: STATE TERROR AND THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE (University of Oklahoma
Press, 1996); Poder y justicia despuds del terror: Ediciones de la Flor, (2000); Malamud
Goti, supra note 6.
44. See, e.g., CHARLES KB. BARTON, GETTING EVEN: REVENGE AS A FORM
OF JUSTICE ch. 2 (Open Court, Chicago and La Salle, 1999).
45. See generally, JEAN HAMPTON and JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, FORGIVENESS
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effect to punishment presupposes that the courts' decisions are
authoritative: that by convicting or acquitting verdicts reflects
the truth about past events. It is idle to expect that the victim
can fulfil his retributive desire and recover his dignity without
trust in the competency and impartiality of the courts. Some
minimal authority is still essential to terminate conflict even for
one who disagrees with this forward-looking retributivist
approach. Attaining this degree of authority seems far more
likely to result from trials from within for two reasons that
sharply differentiate them from trials from without. The first
one lies in the fact that, according to the reasons I have laid out,
the former are much less likely to have a polarizing effect than
the latter. The second is more obvious; it stems from the
(physical and cultural) proximity between the court and the
society where state terrorism took place. Closeness, more
precisely cultural closeness, allows the audience to better witness
and understand the debated arguments,' which in turn makes
verdicts credible.
When I stress the requirement that courts be authoritative, I
have in mind two different levels at which the courts may muster
respect. The first resides in the belief that the court's conviction
implies more than sheer violence, that the court is a legitimate
source of coercion." This notion of authority correlates with that
of justice and punishment as opposed to scape-goating and
revenge. In this sense, the legitimacy of the verdict lies in that it
originates in the correct source and that is thus entitled to
enforce its ruling.4" To claim that the courts have authority at a
second level means that, in grounding their decisions in morally
acceptable legal principles and rules, they are conveying to the
victim that he is right in experiencing resentment, that his
claims stem from reasons genuinely based on justice. 49
AND MERCY (Cambridge University Press 1988); see also Peter Strawson, Freedom and
Resentment, in FREE WILL ch. V (Gary Watson, ed. Oxford University Press 1982).
46. See generally CARLOS S. NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL (Yale University
Press, New Haven and London 1996).
47. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1961)
(H.L.A. Hart appeals to this notion which he calls the rule of recognition, the
acknowledgment that the court is the source of binding decisions).
48. See generally RICHARD FLATHMAN, THE PRACTICE OF POLITICAL
AUTHORITY: AUTHORITY AND THE AUTHORITATIVE 156-158 (University of
Chicago Press 1980).
49. I can think of a third level at which the court's rulings garner widespread
support from the population which thus legitimizes and reasserts the victim's claim. For
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This idea of authority points to the ways in which verdicts
affect direct and indirect victims. These effects are based, as I
pointed out, in some notion of justice and thus cannot be confined
to a politically based apportionment of responsibility. A sizeable
portion of a brutalized citizenry has no perception of their own
rights, and thus they ignore the moral relevance of the facts. It
is the role of retributive justice to generate this awareness,
enabling the victims to press their claims against the
government and the individual transgressors. In the domain of
punishing state crimes, the political and the legal are very much
intertwined, but clearly the latter does not engulf the former.
-6-
I now turn to the issue of just deserts and retribution. In
The Human Condition," Hannah Arendt confronts us with the
perplexing paradox that we can forgive only what we can punish,
and we can only punish what we are in a situation that makes
forgiveness possible. This constraint upon punishing the most
nefarious crimes in history seems to clash with our sense of
justice and deepest emotions. It is evident to us that only by
inflicting pain can we allay the outrage and abomination aroused
by Hitler, Pol-Pot, Stalin and Pinochet. Rather than proper
punishment, however, limited to just retributive reactions, these
passions lead us more in the direction of what we characterize as
revenge.51 I have argued that, unlike revenge, we attach to
punishment the capacity to bring conflicts to a closure and to
restore to the victim the dignity and self-esteem that the abuser
denied him. This can only happen if we meet the conditions
required for punishment to bring about desirable moral
consequences. This requires that the judges enjoy sufficient
moral authority to muster enough trust in their impartiality.
Furthermore, the reasons that support the verdict should be
sufficiently general to convince not only the victim, but also all
reasonable members of the community, including a reflective
perpetrator.
reasons of succinctness I set aside this third conception of authority in spite of its
relevance.
50. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 236-243 (University of
Chicago Press, New York-London 1958)
51. See Id. (In the absence of a civil authority (e.g. authoritative courts) to exact the
suffering, Kant himself conceives of the pain as revenge rather than punishment. Unlike
punishment, revenge is unfit to bring conflict to an end).
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This goes to show that there cannot be a "just retribution" of
radical evil if we refrain from exacting particularly painful and
debasing forms of chastisement. Appeal to such treatment, as
Kant reminds us, would annul our own dignity,52 thus defeating
the very purpose of punishment. It seems indeed that no such
punishment can fit wrongdoing that we characterize as "radical
evil." Retributivism conceives of punishment as returning evil to
where evil originated. How can we then even think of meeting
out just punishment on the genocide perpetrated by the Nazis
and the Kmer-Rouge? There doesn't seem to be a
straightforward answer to this question simply because these
deeds fail to fall within the realm of moral discourse.3 The
assertion that the Nazis acted wrongly, unjustly, or badly seems
simply nonsensical. There are in fact no appropriate moral
qualifications for the acts performed under Pinochet or the
protection of the Argentine juntas. There is not either an
appropriate punishment or the possibility of actual pardon.
These facts strip society from the resources required by what we
could phrase as "doing precise and complete justice." With these
boundaries, it seems that the best option is to pursue other
morally desirable goals, such as the furtherance of the most just
attainable political arrangement.
-7-
I hope my explanations warrant my skepticism about the
consequence we can reasonably expect from justice imposed from
without. This skepticism becomes all the more justified when,
rather than international tribunals, retributive justice is left in
the hands of municipal courts. I relapse on my introductory
caveats. First, this principle does not, of course, encompass the
trials of abuses committed in the course of international wars nor
genuine inter-ethnic conflicts. Any attempt to set up a
Yugoslavian domestic court to try Serbs for crimes committed
against Muslim populations - and vice versa - seems doomed
from its inception. In such cases, the very existence of domestic
courts seems impossible. Second, the thesis I have laid out
should not be interpreted as a rejection of coercive practices in
general. Investigations and reports by foreign countries and
human rights organizations deserve full support and so do
52. See generally IMMANUEL KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 197 (Hans Reiss, ed.
Cambridge University Press 1991).
53. See NINO, supra note 46.
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embargoes and trade sanctions aimed at compelling a regime to
end inhumane practices and eventually to surrender its power to
elected authorities. We should even support efforts of foreign
administrations to try and punish members of their own ranks.
This does not comprehend the endorsement of justice imposed
from without. My main contention is that when foreign
intervention consists of the riddling question of criminally
blaming certain actors, courts in foreign countries thwart
complicated processes whereby contending segments reach peace
agreements and "gag accords"' that over time may turn into
some kind of "reconciliation." Courts from without may also
interfere with strategic forgetfulness and with a community
determination to pardon what can (if anything at all can) be
pardoned. These trials also run the risk of transgressing the
Kantian moral reason that demands the intervention of an
acknowledged civil authority: absence of an international civil
society reduces the notion of punishment to that of the vengeful
infliction of suffering.56
54. See HOLMES, supra note 34.
55. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF VIRTUE:
PART II OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 125 (James W. Ellington, trans., Bobbs-
Merrill Company, Inc., Indianapolis and New York 1988).
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